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A large literature documents that autocratic regimes have not, on average, outperformed
democratic regimes, although they do display greater variance in economic performance. At
the same time, no long-lived autocracy currently is rich whereas every long-lived democracy
is. This paper puts forth a theory to account for these observations. The theory rests
on the idea that autocratic leaders are heterogenous in their preferences and the idea that
special interest groups can successfully lobby a democratic regime for policies that delay
industrialization. We show that an elite landed class chooses to democratize society only
after the economy has accumulated enough wealth.
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11 Introduction
Being of great interest to researchers and policy makers alike, the relationship between political
regime and development has been the focus of much recent empirical and theoretical work. The
picture that has emerged from this research is by no means a simple one, however. Examining
the record over the post World War II period, researchers such as Londregan and Poole (1990),
Przeworski and Limongi (1993), Barro (1996), and Rodrik (1999) have shown that although
democracies have not outperformed autocracies over the post World War II period, they display
less variation in growth experiences. Examining the record over a longer period of time, however,
researchers such as Przeworski et al. (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2009) have shown that
every-long lived democracy currently belongs to the set of rich countries. In contrast, no long-
lived autocracy belongs to this set.
The objective of this paper is to put forth a theory that can account for these observations.
The theory rests on three ideas, each of which have been emphasized separately by others. The
￿rst idea, which is prevalent in the work of Sokolo⁄ and Engerman (2000) is that land owners
may seek to block industrialization on account that it is accompanied by a decline in land rents.
The second idea, which is prevalent in the work of Olson (1982) and Aghion et al. (2007), is
that within a democracy special interest groups can easily lobby the government to implement
or maintain policy that hurts the rest of society. The ￿nal idea, which is prevalent in the work
of Reynolds (1982), Delong and Schleifer (1993) and Jones and Olken (2005) is that autocrats
are not all alike in their objectives and policies, with some more open to growth than others.
When combined, these elements imply that democracy is a middle ground in terms of eco-
nomic development, and that a nation will eventually democratize once it has become su¢ ciently
wealthy. As autocrats di⁄er in their preferences, they choose a di⁄erent mix of policies, thus
implying di⁄erent development paths. A country ruled by a benevolent autocrat will develop
fastest as its leader maximizes social welfare, and hence does not want to implement growth
inhibiting policy. A country ruled by a member of the landed elite class will develop slower on
account that its leader maximizes the welfare of the landed class, and hence erects policies that
slow down the economy￿ s industrialization. A country ruled by a sel￿sh autocrat will develop
slowest on account that its leader will expropriate as much capital as possible to ￿nance his own
consumption. The development policy in a democracy is similar to an elite autocracy as urban
workers, who have the greatest in￿ uence in a democracy, also gain from slowing down the pace
of industrialization.
The similarity in development policies between a democracy and elite autocracy is part of
the reason why a landed elite class, who control the nation￿ s polity in our model, eventually
2democratize society. This democratization decision only happens after the economy has acquired
enough wealth, however. This is because a democratic regime also redistributes land rents to
workers. When landed elites have little capital, the tax on land rents represents a signi￿cant
loss of income, and so democracy is a worse option relative to autocracy, even though there is a
chance the autocrat will have preferences that di⁄er from the landed class. Whereas kleptocratic
and benevolent autocrats produce bad outcomes for the landed class relative to an elite autocrat,
the welfare of a landed household in an expected sense is still greater than his welfare under
democracy when the economy has little wealth. With enough accumulation of capital, however,
the outcome under democracy does not imply a large welfare loss to the elite as the tax on
rental income represents a small fraction of a landed household￿ s total income. At this stage,
the landed elite ￿nd it in their best interest to democratize society.
We illustrate our theory in a version of the Hansen and Prescott (2002) uni￿ed growth model,
to which we add the political layer described above. The Hansen and Prescott model gives
rise to a Malthusian era with stagnant living standards and rising population, followed by an
industrial revolution with slowly rising living standards, followed by a modern growth era with
robust and constant increases in living standards. The Malthusian era corresponds to the use of
a traditional technology that requires land as well as capital and labor inputs. Industrialization
and economic growth begin with the use of the modern technology that requires only capital
and labor inputs. The model is well suited for studying the issues at hand because it implies
that landowners experience a decline in land rents as the economy industrializes and because it
implies that subsequent to industrialization, workers already employed in the modern technology
earn higher wages if rural migration is prohibited.
We calibrate our uni￿ed model of growth and polity to the economic development path of
England and demonstrate that the model matches its political development path reasonably
well. In particular, we assign parameter values so the model matches pre-1700 development ob-
servations, post-1900 modern growth observations and a starting date of 1750 for the Industrial
Revolution, and then examine the choice of the landed class to democratize society. We ￿nd
that the landed class democratize society in 1860, which is roughly the year the right to vote
was extended in England to better paid workers. Additionally, as our model predicts that a
country￿ s history of autocratic draws matters for the date it democratizes, we use the calibrated
model to answer the question how much later would England have democratized if it had been
previously ruled by kleptocrats. We ￿nd that a history of bad autocratic rulers would have
delayed democratization in England by 70 years.
There are vast empirical and theoretical literatures to which this paper relates. Most of
3these papers, however, either examine how polity a⁄ects development or how development
a⁄ects polity, but not both.1 Shen (2007), Acemoglu (2008), Huang (2008), and Paltseva (2008)
are four exceptions. The ￿rst three of these papers di⁄er importantly from us in that violence or
threat of violence is the catalyst of the change in political regimes.2 Whereas political change is
also voluntary in Paltseva (2008), there are important di⁄erences between her and our approach.
For instance, in Paltseva, all autocrats are essentially kleptocrats, who di⁄er in how much
utility they derive from being in power. More importantly, in Paltseva, there e⁄ectively is no
democratization. In her model, the key decision is whether the autocrat will relinquish some
of his power to expropriate resources. While weaker, this autocrat remains in power forever,
however.
There clearly are several countries in which democratization was associated with violence,
and for which the theories of Shen (2007), Acemoglu (2008), and Huang (2008) are more relevant.
However, for many political episodes, there is no evidence that violence was an underlying factor.
For these countries, we think our theory is particularly relevant. Spain, perhaps, is the best
example of a non-violent transition to democracy. Another case, which is far less known, but
perhaps more relevant for our theory is Argentina￿ s ￿ irtation with democracy during the ￿rst
part of the twentieth century.3 As documented by Alston and Gallo (2007), Argentina began its
transition to democracy in the latter part of the nineteenth century as its per capita income level
rose. In 1912, it ended its autocratic tradition with the adoption of free elections with secret
ballots. Between 1912 and 1930, democracy evolved and strengthened. This trend was reversed
as Argentina felt the e⁄ects of the Great Depression. In response to this negative shock on
Argentina￿ s output, the Conservatives, who prior to 1912 controlled the political arena, seized
power away from the Radical Party by way of fraud. Given that the Conservatives retook
political control in 1930, the threat of violence could not have been a motivation for their 1912
decision to democratize the country.4
1 Some of the theoretical papers that examine the causation from political regine to income are Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001), Acemoglu et al. (2004), Acemoglu et al. (2005), Acemoglu and Robinson (2007), Acemoglu
(2008) and Aghion et al. (2007). Some of the theoretical papers that examine the causation from income to
polity are Dahl (1971), Huntington (1991), Rusechemeyer et al. (1992) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).
2 In addition to the political economy literature, there is the uni￿ed growth literature to which our paper
relates. Some important works in this literature in addition to Hansen and Prescott (2002) include Goodfriend
and McDermott (1996), Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2004).
3 In many ways, the model we develop most closely captures the argument of Sokolo⁄ and Engermann (2000)
that landed elites in Latin America stood to lose with industrialization as it implied higher wages to be paid to
farm workers.
4 The discussion of the time indicates that the motivation behind the fraud was a belief by the Conservatives
that they could do a better job of minimizing the e⁄ects of the Great Depression. We thank Andres Gallo
for providing this historical information. For instance, the political dialogue in several of the countries that
experienced rapid increases in per capita income in the postwar period that transitioned to more democratic
systems refers to the fear of expropriation of gains by future autocrats. Such dialogues were present in the
democratization movements of Spain and Portugal in the late 1970￿ s as well as in Taiwan. In Taiwan for example,
rising living standards in the postwar period caused the GMD to include more people in the political process
4The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the relation between political regime
and development in the long run and short run. Section 3 describes the model economy￿ s
structure whereas section 4 describes its political structure. Section 5 reports the results of a
series of numerical experiments based on a calibration of the model to Britain￿ s experience that
show that democracy is a middle ground, and that a country with a history of good autocratic
draws will democratize ￿rst. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Observations
In this section we present evidence that suggests that democracy is a middle ground in the short
run, but not in the long run, thereby motivating our theory. In doing so, we draw on the work
of several researchers, particularly Persson and Tabellini (2009), and Rodrik (1999).
We begin with the short run, which has received far greater attention. The majority of this
work e⁄ectively compares ￿rst moments of the distributions of growth rates for democracies
and for autocracies, ￿nding no statistical di⁄erence. Rodrik (1999), however, provides a more
comprehensive picture of the distribution of growth rates by political regimes by examining
second moments, ￿nding greater variance of growth rates for autocratic regimes. Thus, both
the best and the worst growth performances in this period correspond to autocratic regimes.5
Rather than reproduce Rodrik￿ s ￿gures, we plot yearly polity indices for the ￿ve fastest
growing economies over the 1950-2004 period, which are Singapore, Taiwan, S. Korea, Botswana,
and Thailand. These are shown in Figure 1. A country is identi￿ed as being democratic if its
polity index is between 0 and 10 in the Polity IV data base and autocratic if it is between 0 and
negative 10. Only Botswana was democratic at the start of its miracle. Looking more broadly
at the ￿fteen fastest growing economies in this period, we ￿nd that two thirds were autocratic
when they began their growth miracles. Besides the aforementioned countries, this set includes
Cyprus, Japan, Romania, China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Portugal, Mauritius, Republic of Congo,
Spain, and Ireland.
[Figure 1 here]
We next turn to the long-run, which focusses on the relation between income levels and
polity rather than growth rates. The relevant data are summarized in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2
pertains to those countries that were listed as being democratic in 2000 according to the Polity
IV Project and is a reproduction of Persson and Tabellini (2009, Figure 2) whereas Figure 3
pertains to those countries that were listed as being autocratic. Both ￿gures plot each country￿ s
(Mau-Kei 2004).
5 Similar ￿ndings are reported in Cuberes and Jerzmanowki (2008).
52000 level of per capita GDP as reported by the PWT 6.2 against the number of years its 2000
regime has been in place.
Figure 2 shows that every country with a long history of democratic rule, (i.e., 100 years or
more), is rich, (i.e. displays per capita GDP greater or equal to 40 percent of the US level). In
contrast, Figure 3 shows that only one country with a history of 100 years or more of autocratic
rule is rich. This country is Qatar, whose main source of income is, of course, oil. While perhaps
not as dramatic, the pattern holds for shorter durations as well. For example, almost every
country with a history of 50 or more years of democracy is rich whereas no non-oil autocracy
is. A simple linear regression of duration of regime on income shows that length of duration of
democracy is positively correlated with income with a slope of .005. For autocracies, the slope
of the regression line is not statistically di⁄erent from zero.
[Figures 2 and 3 here]
Whereas one might be tempted to conclude from Figures 2 and 3 that democracy causes
income, the short run ￿ndings do not support this direction of causation. Figure 1 lends further
support for this direction of causation, as it shows that, with the exception of Singapore,
countries that experienced a growth miracle became more democratic as incomes rose. For
these reasons, we make the causation from income to democracy a key feature of our theory.6
3 The Model - Economic Structure
We start by describing the economic structure of the model and relevant maximization problems
of its private agents, postponing for now the description of its political structure. In doing so,
this section treats policy parametrically and examines the choices of private agents given that
a certain policy is in place.
The economic side of the model is a version of the Hansen and Prescott (2002) develop-
ment and growth model modi￿ed to allow for one-period lived heterogeneous households and
spatial elements. In particular, whereas all households are endowed with capital, only some are
endowed with time and only some are endowed with land. Moreover, whereas there are still
two technologies to produce the economy￿ s single ￿nal good, we assume that the Malthusian
(traditional) technology is operated in the countryside whereas the Solow (modern) technology
is operated in the city side. This implies that a worker household (i.e., one who is endowed
with time) begins his life living in either the rural area or urban area, depending on whether
6 Acemoglu et al. (2007) argue this causation is not robust using a ￿xed e⁄ect model in a regression of income
on democracy. Their ￿nding has been criticized on econometric grounds by Gundlach and Paldam (2008).
6his parents were employed by a Malthusian ￿rm or a Solow ￿rm. Whether he ends his life in
his area of birth depends on his decision whether to migrate.7
We now describe in detail the economic structure of the model.
3.1 Business Sector
The business sector is perfectly competitive, and produces a single composite commodity by one
of two Cobb-Douglas technologies that di⁄er in their mix of inputs and rates of technological
change. In addition, the two technologies di⁄er in their locations. In particular, the traditional
or Malthusian technology can only be operated in the rural region whereas the modern or Solow
technology can only be operated in the urban region.
3.1.1 Malthus
The traditional (Malthus) technology uses land, labor and capital to produce the economy￿ s
￿nal good. Let Ymt denote the output produced with this technology, Kmt denote the capital








In Equation (1), Amt is total factor productivity, which grows exogenously at rate ￿m ￿ 0.
Thus, Amt+1 = (1 + ￿m)Amt.
3.1.2 Solow
The modern (Solow) technology uses labor and capital to produce the economy￿ s ￿nal good.
Let Yst denote the output produced with this technology, Kst denote the capital input, and Hst




Total factor productivity in the modern technology, Ast, also grows at an exogenous at rate
denoted by ￿s ￿ 0. In contrast to the traditional technology, TFP in the modern technology
is a⁄ected by policy. Let 0 ￿ ￿st < 1 denote this policy barrier in period t. Then, Ast =
(1 + ￿s)(1 ￿ ￿st)Ast￿1. .8
7 While we identify landowners as the group with vested interests in the status quo, none of our conclusions
would change if we followed something along the lines of Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) where workers who acquired
capital in the old technology comprise the group that tries to prevent technological change.
8 In specifying this law of motion for Solow TFP, it follows that a barrier implemented in period t has a
permanent e⁄ect on Solow TFP. In Section 6.4, Sensitivity of Results, we consider the alternative assumption
where the TFP barrier is temporary.
73.2 Household Sector
Households in the model live for a single period and belong to one of three groups. The ￿rst
group consists of the economy￿ s elites, who own its stock of land. The next two groups consist of
worker households, and are endowed with one unit of time. These groups are distinguished by
region of birth, either rural or urban. We use the letter j = fe;r;ug to denote a household￿ s type
and Njt to denote its measure. The total population at time t is denoted Nt = Net +Nrt +Nut:
For future reference, let p denote the working class and Npt denote the measure of such agents,
i.e.Npt = Nrt + Nut:
3.2.1 Preferences
Preferences are the same across household types. Each household derives utility from its own
consumption as well as the total bequests it leaves to its children. Bequests are in the form of
today￿ s ￿nal good, and hence do not include land holdings in the case of elite households. In






where cjt is household consumption, and Bjt are total family bequests.
3.2.2 Demographics
Demographics are a⁄ected by worker migration as well as population growth.
Migration We assume only rural households can migrate, hence, ruling out the possibility of
reverse industrialization.9 There is a time cost associated with migrating to the city, denoted
by ￿ut. Thus, a rural household who migrates can only supply 1 ￿ ￿ut units of labor to Solow
￿rms. This time cost is the result of policy, and not a feature of technology. On account of
migration, the measure of households employed in the modern sector, Nst, will not necessarily
equal the measure of households that begin in the urban sector, Nut. Similarly, the measure
of households employed in the traditional sector, Nmt will not necessarily equal the measure of
households who start in the rural sector, Nrt.
Population Growth Following Hansen and Prescott (2002), children are exogenous from the
standpoint of the parent. For elite households, we assume zero population growth, namely,
Net+1 = Net
9 We never found in any experiment that urban workers would have wanted to return to the countryside.
8This assumption is meant to re￿ ect the prevalence of the primogeniture system prior to the 18th
century, where all land was passed down to the oldest child. For worker households, we assume
that in period t their measure grows at rate gt. Rural and urban households, therefore, have
the same growth rate in each period. This assumption is made for analytical and notational
convenience, rather than for historical accuracy. In particular, by assuming the same population
growth rate for all households, one does not need to divide city workers into migrants and non-
migrants for the purpose of determining population dynamics.
Dynamics Let ￿t denote the fraction of rural households that do not migrate in period t.
Given that Nrt households begin the period in the rural sector, Nut households begin the period
in the urban sector, the measure of households in the next period that starts out in the rural
sector is
Nrt+1 = gt￿tNrt (3)
and the measure of households in the next period that starts in the urban sector is
Nut+1 = gt(1 ￿ ￿t)Nrt + gtNut
Next period￿ s population is thus,
Nt+1 = Nrt+1 + Nut+1 + Net+1
3.2.3 Endowments
A worker household is endowed with one unit of time whereas an elite household is endowed
with let units of land. The endowment of an elite corresponds to the land he inherits from
his parents. As the measure of elite households is constant over time, land endowments are
constant. Denoting the economy￿ s stock of land by L, an elite household￿ s land endowment in
any period is le = L=Ne:
All households receive bequests from their parents, which can be converted into physical
capital. Let kjt denote the capital of a household of type j 2 fe;r;ug alive in period t. The
amount of capital a household is endowed with also depends on the fraction of bequests ex-
propriated by the government, denoted by 0 ￿ ￿bt < 1. For an elite household born in period
t,
ket = (1 ￿ ￿bt)Bet￿1
Similarly, for a rural household born in period t
krt = (1 ￿ ￿bt)Brt￿1=gt￿1
9For an urban household born in period t, we assume an implicit tax and transfer system ensuring
that all such households have identical bequests. Thus,
kut = (1 ￿ ￿bt)[But￿1Nut￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿t￿1)Brt￿1Nrt￿1]=Nut
Absent this assumption, bequests received by urban households would possibly di⁄er on account
that migrant urban parents would typically have lower earnings than non-migrant urban parents.
3.3 Utility Maximization
With Cobb-Douglas preferences, each household, regardless of its type, spends fraction, ￿, of its
income on the consumption good, and fraction, 1￿￿, on bequests, where ￿ is the consumption
share parameter in the household utility function. Thus, the optimal consumption and bequests
are
cjt = ￿Ijt (4)
Bjt = (1 ￿ ￿)Ijt (5)
where Ijt denotes the income of a household of type j 2 fu;r;eg in period t. Substituting (4)
and (5) into the utility function, one obtains the indirect utility of the type j household:
Wjt = ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿ Ijt (6)
Income di⁄erences between rural, urban and elite households are the result of di⁄erences in
endowments and policies that target speci￿c household groups. For the landed elite, income is
generated by renting capital and land. Capital is not technology speci￿c, and so can be rented
to either Solow or Malthus ￿rms at the same rental price. A tax on land rents is the lone
government policy that a⁄ects landowner￿ s income. Speci￿cally, landed elite income is
Iet = (1 ￿ ￿lt)rltle + rktket (7)
where rlt denotes the rental price of land, rkt denotes the rental price of capital, and ￿lt denotes
the tax rate on land rental income.
Worker households in contrast earn income by renting capital and supplying labor. The
main policies that a⁄ect their income are a transfer payment, Tlt, ￿nanced out of of land rent
taxes, and a migration barrier, 0 ￿ ￿ut < 1. The migration barrier reduces the amount of time
that a migrant worker can supply to Solow ￿rms. Its existence implies that the wage rate paid
by Solow ￿rms, wst, will not equal the wage rate paid by Malthus ￿rms, wmt in equilibrium. In
addition to these two policies, we assume that worker households are subject to a ￿xed time cost
10associated with lobbying that depends on the political regime in place as well as the household￿ s
region of birth. We postpone the description of these ￿xed costs until next section. For the
purpose at hand, we simply denote these ￿xed time costs by fjt, j 2 fr;ug:
In light of the above discussion, the income of a household born in the city is just
Iut = wst(1 ￿ fut) + rktkut + Tlt
and the income of a household born in the countryside is
Irt = wmt(1 ￿ frt) + rktkrut + Tlt:
Whereas a rural household can migrate and earn the Solow wage rate, migrants must earn the
same wage income as stayers in equilibrium. For this reason, every household born in the rural
region earns the same income regardless of whether it migrates or not.10
3.4 Pro￿t Maximization
As land is only used in the traditional sector, the Malthusian technology will be used in every
period. The pro￿t maximizing conditions of Malthusian ￿rms are






















The Solow technology, in contrast, need not be operated in a given period, but if operated, it
must be the case that ￿rms using it earn non-negative pro￿ts. The pro￿ts of a ￿rm operating
the Solow technology are
AstK￿
stH1￿￿
st ￿ wstHst ￿ rktKst (11)




wst ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)AstK￿
stH￿￿
st (13)
As in Hansen and Prescott (2002), the Solow technology is not pro￿table to operate as long as










10 For this reason, it is unnecessary to distinguish the optimal consumption and bequest choices of migrant
rural households from non-migrant rural households.
11The lone di⁄erence between this expression and the one derived in Hansen and Prescott (2002)
is the appearance of the Solow wage rate in the unit cost term. In Hansen and Prescott (2002)
the wage rates in the two sectors are identical, but here they need not be on account of the
migration barriers. To express this condition in terms of the wage rate paid by Malthusian
￿rms, we use the result that there must be migration in the ￿rst period the Solow technology is
used, and the result that a rural household must earn the same wages if he stayed or migrated,
namely,
wmt(1 ￿ frt) = (1 ￿ ￿ut ￿ frt)wst











To understand how policy a⁄ects the date an economy begins to industrialize, we insert the law
of motion for Solow TFP in period t, Ast = (1 ￿ ￿st)(1+￿s)Ast￿1into the left hand side of the
above expression. We next use the result that if Solow is not pro￿table, then all the economy￿ s
capital and labor are employed in Malthus and so the Malthusian wage rate and the rental price
of capital equal their marginal products when all of the economy￿ s resources are employed in
that sector. Equation (14) can thus be rewritten as:
(1 ￿ ￿st)(1 + ￿s)Ast￿1 ￿ Amt
￿
1 ￿ frt
















As (15) shows, the Solow TFP barrier and the migration barrier directly delay the date at
which the economy ￿rst begins to use the Solow technology. The expropriation barrier does not
appear in the above expression, but it is easy to verify that it will a⁄ect the right hand side of
the equation by lowering the economy￿ s capital stock.11
3.5 Equilibrium Prices and Quantities
As the ￿rst period in our model is indexed by t = 1, the relevant initial conditions for the econ-
omy are the bequests Be0;Br0 and Bu0 and the measure of each household type, Ne1;Nr1 and
Nu1. The policy, which at this stage is treated parametrically, consists of (￿ut;￿bt;￿lt;￿st;Tlt)
and lobbying costs, frt and fut. In addition, policy includes government consumption, cgt. Pol-
icy, albeit exogenously given for now, must be feasible. A policy is feasible if the sum of land
rent transfers to worker households equals land taxes collected from landed households and if
the sum of government consumption equals expropriated bequests.
11 If ￿ >  , so that production in the modern sector is more capital-intensive than production in the traditional
sector, a larger capital stock increases the incentives for using the modern technology. The policy maker can
delay the switch to Solow by increasing ￿ut, the cost of commuting to the urban area.
12In terms of prices and allocations, the equilibrium path for the economy constitutes a
sequence of household variables fWet;Wrt;Wut;ket;krt;kut;Bet;Brt;But;cet;crt;cut;￿tg, a se-
quence of ￿rm allocations, fYmt;Kmt;Hmt;Yst,Kst;Hstg; a sequence of prices fwmt;wst;rkt;rltg
and a sequence of laws of motions for fNet+1;Nrt+1;Nut+1;let+1g, which satisfy
1. Utility maximization of the households. Given the policy, prices and endowments, (cjt;Bjt)
maximizes the utility of the household j = e;r;u subject to its budget constraint, and
Wjt equals the household￿ s indirect utility.
2. Migration decision: Rural households stay put if wmt(1 ￿ frt) > (1 ￿ ￿ut ￿ frt)wst, and
are indi⁄erent if wmt(1 ￿ frt) = (1 ￿ ￿ut ￿ frt)wst
3. Pro￿t maximization of Malthusian ￿rms. Given prices, Ymt;Kmt; and Hmt maximize
pro￿ts of Malthusian ￿rms
4. Pro￿t maximization of Solow ￿rms: Given prices, Yst;Kst; and Hst maximize pro￿ts of
Solow ￿rms
5. Market clearing
a. Goods market: Net(cet + Bet) + Nrt(crt + Brt) + Nut(cut + But) + cgt = Yst + Ymt
b. Land rental market: Lt = Netle
c. Capital rental market: Kmt + Kst = Netket + Nrtkrt + Nutkut
d. Labor markets: ￿tNrt(1￿frt) = Hmt and (1￿￿t)Nrt(1￿￿ut￿frt)+Nut(1￿fut) = Hst
6. Laws of Motion
a. Nrt+1 = gt￿tNrt
b. Nut+1 = gt[(1 ￿ ￿t)Nrt + Nut]
c. Net+1 = Net
d. ket = (1 ￿ ￿bt)Bet￿1
e. kut = (1 ￿ ￿bt)[But￿1Nut￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿t)Brt￿1Nrt￿1]=Nut
f. krt = (1 ￿ ￿bt)Brt￿1=gt￿1
7. Policy Feasibility
a. Land Tax system: ￿ltrltL = (Nrt + Nut)Tlt
b. Expropriations: cgt = ￿bt(Bet￿1Net￿1 + Brt￿1Nrt￿1 + But￿1Nut￿1)
134 The Model - Political Structure
Having described the economic side of the model, we next turn to its political side, of which
there are two layers. At the top, there is the decision of the elite over the polity for the economy.
More speci￿cally, at the beginning of each period, the political elite, which is comprised of the
landed households, chooses between autocracy and democracy for the economy￿ s polity. At the
bottom, the ruler chooses the policy.
By choosing autocracy, the political elite subject the economy to uncertainty over the pref-
erences of the ruler. There are three types of autocratic rulers: a good autocrat who cares
about the welfare of all households; an elite autocrat who cares only about the welfare of the
landed class; and a bad autocrat who only cares about his own consumption. By choosing
democracy, the political elite do not subject the economy to this type of uncertainty. However,
in democratizing society they empower labor so that workers can lobby democratic leaders
to choose policies that favor them. Prior to industrialization, the labor lobby consists of all
worker households, but subsequent to industrialization, the labor lobby consists only of urban
households.
We now describe this political structure in detail, starting with the bottom layer.
4.1 Policy Determination
We denote the political regime in period t by the letter Rt, where Rt can either be A for
autocracy or D for democracy. Regardless of regime, the policy maker chooses a six-element
vector of instruments, (cgt;￿ut;￿bt;￿lt;￿st;Tlt). As discussed in the previous section, land tax
revenues are redistributed to worker households in the form of a lump-sum transfer, and the
leader￿ s private consumption are ￿nanced out of expropriated bequests.12 On account of these
assumptions, the leader￿ s choices e⁄ectively reduces to four-instruments, ￿ut;￿bt;￿lt and ￿st.
There are clearly other policy instruments we could have modeled. For instance, we could
have added an investment barrier that was technology speci￿c, such that one unit of output
invested in the modern technology resulted in less than one unit of Solow capital. The policy
measures we model represent the smallest set that generates di⁄erent policy choices and hence
development paths under the di⁄erent regimes and di⁄erent autocrats. The omission of other
policy instruments such as the technology-speci￿c investment barrier is based on ￿ndings that
their inclusion did not alter the results.
12 Whereas the policy component, ￿lt, constitutes a tax on land rental income in the model, we think of it more
in the nature of land reform. This is the implicit reason why we assume that all land rental taxes are transferred
to worker households and are not used by the leader for his own consumption.
144.1.1 Autocracy
We begin with the policy choices when an autocratic regime is in place. There are three autocrat
types, which we refer to as Good, Elite, and Bad, denoted by the letter a 2 fG;E;Bg: Each






lt) subject to Net￿ltrltl = (Nrt + Nut)Tlt
and cgt = ￿bt(Bet￿1Net￿1 + Brt￿1Nrt￿1 + But￿1Nut￿1) to maximize his utility. Utility is a
function of the autocrat￿ s own consumption, the indirect utility of elite households, the indirect
utility of rural households, and the indirect utility of urban households. Let V a denote the
welfare of autocrat a. The welfare of a type a autocrat is:
V a = ￿aca
gt + (1 ￿ ￿a)[￿a








where ￿a is the weight a type a autocrat places on his consumption, and ￿a
tis the weight he
places on the welfare of the elite class versus the working class. The weight he places on the
welfare of the elite class versus the working class is time dependent to allow for changes in the
demographic structure among workers and elites over the development process.13
Autocratic heterogeneity is captured via di⁄erent weights in (16). For the good autocrat,
i.e., a = G, ￿G = 0 and ￿G
t = Net=Nt. Thus, autocrat G is essentially a social planner who
maximizes a weighted average of household welfare with weights that are equal to the share of
each household type in the population. Given the deadweight losses with imposing barriers, a
good autocrat will be inclined to erect zero barriers. For the elite autocrat, i.e., a = E; ￿E = 0
and ￿E
t = 1, and so V E = Wet. Thus, as the elite autocrat maximizes the indirect utility of
a member of the elite class, he may want to impose barriers that delay the industrialization
process. For the bad autocrat, i.e., a = B; ￿B = 1, so that he maximizes his own consumption.
Thus, the bad autocrat will want to expropriate bequests at the highest rate possible.
4.1.2 Democracy
Whereas the policy instruments available in a democracy are the same as in an autocracy,






lt), the objective function is di⁄erent. By assumption, the
democratic ruler cares only about the welfare of workers, or certain subclasses of workers. In
particular, the welfare of a democratic ruler, V D, is
V D =
￿
Wrt if t ￿ t￿
Wut if t > t￿ (17)
13 By assumption, an autocrat￿ s reign is only a single period so he chooses policy with the sole objective of
maximizing his utility. Moreover, in contrast to the selectorate framework of Besley and Kudamatsu (2007), the
political elite cannot replace the autocrat in the period should he turn out to have preferences that di⁄er from
them, and thus wants to implement a policy that harms landowners. This happens if the autocrat turns out to
be a kleptocrat, in which case capital is expropriated. In contrast, when the autocrat belongs to the class of
landowners, he will block the new technology and delay industrialization.
15In (17), t￿ denotes the ￿rst period in which the Solow technology is used. Accordingly, prior to
industrialization, the democrat maximizes the utility of the representative worker, but there-
after, the democrat maximizes the welfare of workers born in the city.
Microfoundations for (17) are based on the lobbying model of Persson and Tabellini (2000),
and presented in the Appendix. By assumption, workers are more politically powerful in a
democracy and thus able to a⁄ect the policy platforms of democratic candidates through lob-
bying e⁄orts. When the worker class represents a majority of the population, this assumption
is in line with the median voter model.14
We assume that the lobbying group incurs a ￿xed cost per member denoted by fd, measured
in units of time. By assumption, no worker can free ride and avoid this cost. Prior to the
existence of an indigenous urban population, (i.e., t ￿ t￿), the lobbying group is the population
of worker households, all of whom start the period in the rural sector. For this reason, frt =
fd > 0 for t ￿ t￿. Once an indigenous urban population is in place (i.e., t > t￿), frt = 0 and
fut = fd > 0. Urban immigrant workers, therefore, do not incur any ￿xed cost.
The assumption that the democratic ruler seeks to maximize the welfare of the average
industrialized worker once an indigenous urban population exists is important to the results,
speci￿cally, that democracy gives rise to some development inhibiting policy. In particular, in
maximizing the welfare of urban workers, a democratic leader will impose migration barriers in
order to prevent a decline in the wage rate paid by Solow ￿rms. This assumption has a real
world basis, as well: in Latin America, many populist policies favored urban residents at the
expense of rural households.
4.2 The Decision of the Elite
Having described the objectives of autocratic and democratic rulers, we next turn to the decision
of the elites over the nation￿ s political regime. This decision, which is made at the start of each
period, is reversible. Thus, the landed elite at the start of each period decide whether the
economy should be autocratic or democratic.
The decision of the elite over polity is a simple comparison of expected utility under the two
regimes. In particular, the elites choose democracy if the utility of its representative member











14 Another motivation for this utility function is that it makes the choice of the landed elite to democratize
society interesting. If the elite utility entered the democratic leader￿ s objective, then the elite would choose to
democratize starting in the ￿rst period.
16where Wet is determined by (6).
In (18), Pra denotes the probability of drawing an autocrat of type a, which is a function
of the total bequests from the previous period. In what follows, we assume the probability of
drawing a good autocrat is independent of parental bequests so that Pra(Bt￿1) = Pra; we
assume the probability of drawing a bad autocrat is a non-decreasing function of bequests,
and the probability of drawing an elite is a non-increasing function of bequests that satis￿es
Pre(Bt￿1) = 1 ￿ Pra ￿Prb(Bt￿1).
The assumption that the probability of drawing a bad autocrat is a non-decreasing function
of parental bequests turns out to be important for some of the model￿ s results, namely, that
countries with a history of bad draws democratize later. There is an empirical and theoretical
basis for this assumption as well. Empirically, countries with greater natural wealth have often
been ruled by kleptocrats. A number of authors such as Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003)
have linked oil reserves with kleptocratic regimes in the postwar period, and Drelichman and
Voth (2003) have linked in￿ ows of silver reserves from Peru to a deterioration in good governance
by the Spanish crown at the turn of the 17th century.
Theoretically, the assumption is consistent with the choice of an autocrat whether to be a
kleptocrat. Suppose for instance that an elite￿ s utility depends on his own personal consumption
and inclusion into elite society. Suppose further that if an individual expropriates bequests he
will be ostracized from elite society. Then, he will be more likely to choose to be kleptocratic
if bequests are larger. In the appendix, we demonstrate how this implies a probability function
that is increasing in the amount of total bequests.15
4.3 Political Equilibrium
With this extra layer, we must add the following elements to the de￿nition of an equilibrium
polity type and lobbying costs fRt;fut;frtg, probability of realizing a particular autocratic type,







lt)z2Zg. Here we use Z to denote the set of all possible rulers, namely, a good, elite, and
bad autocrat, and a democrat. Additionally, we must add the following two conditions to the
equilibrium conditions stated earlier regarding the market side of the economy. These two
conditions are:
1. The elite choose political regime Rt according to (18).






lt) maximizes the objective of each potential leader.
15 The assumption that the probability of drawing a good autocrat is independent of bequests corresponds to a
society where some potential leaders are truly benevolent in their philosophy, and cannot be tempted by factors
that a⁄ect their personal gain.
175 Numerical Experiments
We next explore the equilibrium properties of the model via a set of numerical experiments.
Since individuals have one-period lives, the solution reduces to a sequence of static problems with
the dynamic elements being the measure of working households, bequests, and TFP. Despite
the static nature of the optimization problems, closed form solutions are not forthcoming. For
this reason, we parameterize the model and solve for its equilibrium numerically. The basic
strategy for assigning parameter values is to match certain features of England￿ s development
path over the 1650 to 2000 period, most notably, an industrialization date around 1750.
We use the calibrated structure to examine three questions. First, what is the model￿ s
predictions for the date England should have democratized? Empirically, we identify 1867, the
year that the right to vote was extended to better paid workers, as the date of democratization
in England. Second, does the model predict that democracy is a middle ground development
path? Recall, that in the postwar period autocracies have not on average performed di⁄erently
than democracies, although they display greater variance in performances. Lastly, does the
model predict that higher incomes causes democratization? Here, we are interested in seeing
whether the model is consistent with the observation that every long-lived democracy has a
high living standard whereas no long-lived autocracy is.
To answer these questions, we proceed in two steps. In the ￿rst, we shut down two elements
of the model economy. Namely, we remove uncertainty over autocratic type and the landed
elite￿ s decision to democratize society. Whereas policy is endogenous, an economy￿ s leader is
taken as given and constant over time. The point of shutting down these elements is to illustrate
how polity a⁄ects economic performance. The second experiment reintroduces these elements so
that the political regime is chosen by the landed elite and autocratic type is a random variable.
The point of this second set of experiments is to examine how economic development feedbacks
to political development.
5.1 Parameters
Before assigning parameters it is necessary to identify the empirical counterparts of a period as
well as the ￿rst model period. Given that each generation lives for a single period, the empirical
counterpart of a model period is identi￿ed as 35 years. For the starting date, i.e., t = 1, we
associate it with the year 1650. Whereas the choice of starting date is unimportant to the
results, we associate t = 1 with 1650 because England￿ s Glorious Revolution occurs in 1688.
Table 1 reports the values of the model parameters, and provides a brief comment on how
each value is assigned. An additional comment is warranted in the case of the initial value for
18the Solow TFP parameter. As reported, its value is assigned so that industrialization starts in
1750 (t = 4) for an economy governed by good autocrats. The reason we assume the economy
is governed by good autocrats is twofold. First, the date at which an economy industrializes
depends on its history of rulers, and second, our interpretation of England￿ s history is that it
was ruled by good autocrats following the Glorious Revolution.
[Table 1 here]
In addition to the parameters listed in the table, it is necessary to specify and parameterize the
population growth rates of workers and the functions governing the probability of drawing each
particular type of autocrat. For the population growth rates, we simply assign the rates for
each associated period as estimated by Maddison (2001). For the probability of drawing each
autocratic type, we assume the following parameterized functions:
PrG = :10 (19)
PrB(Bt￿1) = minf:85;0:10 + 0:5Bt￿1 + :8B2
t￿1g (20)
and
PrE(Bt￿1) = 1 ￿ PrG(Bt￿1) ￿ PrB(Bt￿1) (21)
By assumption then, the probability of drawing a bad autocrat increases at an increasing rate
and the probability of drawing a elite autocrat decreases at an increasing rate. As there is
no independent evidence that suggests a positive second derivative for PrB(Bt￿1), we will
investigate the relevance of this assumption in the sensitivity analysis conducted at the end of
this section.
Finally, in light of the objectives of policy makers, it is necessary to place upper bounds on
the policy choices. For this, we set an upper bound on the choice of land rent taxes to :9; an
upper bound for the bequest expropriation rate at :9; an upper bound on migration barriers to
:8; and an upper bound on Solow TFP barriers to :3. This completes the calibration procedure.
5.2 The E⁄ect of Polity on Performance
We begin by removing the randomness over autocrat types and the choice of political regime
by the landed elite, and solve the equilibrium paths for four economies, each with a di⁄erent
ruler type that does not change over time. The four economies correspond to a good autocracy,
elite autocracy, bad autocracy, and democracy. Each economy starts out with the same amount
of bequests for elite households and worker households and the same size population. By the
19parameterization, only the Malthusian technology is used in the ￿rst period, so that every
worker resides in the rural area in each economy.
Figures 4 and 5 document the paths of per capita capital and GDP, respectively, for each of
the four economies over the ￿rst 20 periods.
[Figures 4 and 5 here]
For both measures, the ranking of performances is: good autocracy, democracy, elite autocracy,
and then bad autocracy. The di⁄erences between regimes is more pronounced for the capital
stock measures. This is understandable in light of the importance, or lack thereof, of capital in
the production functions. Democracy is a middle ground and autocratic regimes display greater
variation in their development paths.
Table 2 reports the optimal policies in each period and the pro￿tability of the Solow technol-
ogy for each regime. Democracy and good autocracy are both ￿rst to industrialize in period 4.
The bad autocracy is next industrializing in period 5, followed by the elite autocracy in period
7. The good autocrat does not erect any barriers whereas the bad autocrat only expropriates
bequest. The elite autocrat initially does not put up any barriers, but then eventually retards
development by implementing both migration and Solow TFP barriers. In the democracy, land
rents are initially redistributed and post industrialization, barriers to migration are erected.
[Table 2 here]
The policy choices for each economy are easy to understand in light of its leader￿ s preferences,
and industrialization dates are easy to understand in light of the policy choices. The good
autocrat never erects any barriers since he e⁄ectively maximizes aggregate welfare in the econ-
omy. Without any distortions in place, the economy industrializes early. The bad autocrat only
expropriates capital because this is the only way to ￿nance his personal consumption. With no
barriers to either migration or Solow TFP, a bad autocrat has an indirect and modest e⁄ect
on the condition for which Solow is pro￿table, namely by lowering the aggregate capital stock.
Thus, industrialization is delayed only one period compared to the good autocracy. In a democ-
racy, the leader redistributes land (rents) at the upper bound in every period as he cares only
about the welfare of workers. This policy choice has no e⁄ect on the Solow pro￿tability condi-
tion, however, because land has no use in the economy other than the traditional and because
preferences are homothetic. It is only after the economy industrializes, so that the leader wishes
to maximize the welfare of the indigenous urban working class, that a distortionary, growth in-
hibiting policy is implemented. Thus, the democracy industrializes in the same period as a good
autocracy. In contrast, the elite autocrat implements distortionary policy both in the form of a
20migration barrier and TFP barrier prior to industrialization because he seeks to maximize the
welfare of the landed elite, who experiences a decline in land rents when resources move into the
modern sector. The Solow TFP barrier has a direct e⁄ect on the Solow pro￿tability condition,
which contributes importantly to the three period delay in the economy￿ s industrialization.16
[Figures 6-8 here]
Figures 6-8 highlight other di⁄erences between the four economies. Figure 6 compares the speed
of the structural transformation between economies by plotting the Nut=Npt in each period. Not
surprisingly, the structural transformation occurs fastest in a good autocracy. The pattern is
very similar for all autocratic regimes, but di⁄erent for the democracy. Whereas the democracy￿ s
structural transformation starts before the bad and elite autocracies￿ , it proceeds at a slower
rate. This corresponds to the erection of the migration barrier that follows the establishment
of an urban working class.
Figure 7 displays the evolution of elite income under the four economies whereas Figure 8
plots Gini coe¢ cients for the four economies. Not surprisingly elite income is greatest in the elite
autocracy, followed by democracy, good autocracy, and lastly by bad autocracy. These rankings
are relevant for understanding the results of the next subsection. In terms of the distribution
of income, the Gini coe¢ cients shown in Figure 8 reveal that inequality increases initially
under each autocratic ruler over the pre-industrialization period, but subsequently declines,
approaching zero in the limit. Not surprisingly, the decline is fastest in the good autocracy
on account of it being ￿rst to industrialize. The evolution of inequality under democracy is
very di⁄erent, and displays an inverted u-shape pattern. Initially, inequality is low on account
of the land redistribution tax. However, with industrialization and the erection of migration
barriers by urban workers, wage di⁄erences between urban and rural workers rise, leading to a
rise in inequality. Eventually, enough of the population has migrated, and with the assumption
that guarantees that individuals born in the urban area start with the same bequests, incomes
become more equal.17
16 Interestingly, whereas the elite autocrat could continue to add new barriers to Solow TFP and prevent
industrialization for additional periods, he chooses not to do so. The reason for this is that as income and wealth
increase, the capital component of the elite￿ s income comes to represent a greater fraction of total income. At
this stage, the elites bene￿t from industrialization, as industrialization leads to a higher rental price of capital.
This explains why Solow TFP barriers are never erected post industrialization and why migration barriers are
lessened.
17 Over time, the Gini coe¢ cients in all four economies approach 0. The reason the economies become more
equitable over time is that the population shares of the landed elite and the rural workers eventually become
negligible. Towards the end of the modern era, there is e⁄ectively only one group holding all the wealth in the
economy, namely the urban workers. Since there is no income heterogeneity within the urban group, the gini
coe¢ cients tend to zero in the long run.
215.3 The E⁄ect of Performance on Polity
Having investigated the causation from polity to development and shown that democracy is a
middle ground, we now address our two remaining questions: namely, whether higher income
causes democracy and whether the calibrated model predicts a democratization date for England
that is line with the historical record. For this purpose, we reintroduce uncertainty over autocrat
type into the model and give the landed elites the power in each period to choose whether to
democratize society.
Why would the landed elites in the model ever choose to democratize society? There are
several forces at hand, the most important of which relates to how the elite fare under a
democracy as the economy accumulates capital. E⁄ectively, when the economy is poor and so
most of an elite￿ s income is in the form of land rents, democracy is extremely costly as the
ruler taxes land at its maximum rate. As the economy develops, this tax has a smaller impact
on elite utility because land rents represent a smaller component of elite income. Moreover,
subsequent to industrialization, the democrat imposes a migration barrier, which is desirable
from the standpoint of the elite. Thus, elite welfare under democracy starts o⁄low, but increases
rapidly as the economy develops.
Another force relates to changes in the probability that a given autocratic type rules the
country as an economy develops. Recall that we assumed that the probability of drawing an
elite autocrat is decreasing in aggregate bequests. The elite will democratize society as long as
their welfare under democracy is greater than their expected utility under autocracy. Of course,
the elite are happiest under an elite autocrat, so a reduction in the probability of drawing one
of their own has the e⁄ect of reducing expected utility under autocracy. This makes it more
likely that the elite will eventually democratize society.
[Figures 9a-b, 10a-b here]
To better understand these forces, we plot an elite￿ s welfare under autocracy and democracy
for extreme cases of autocratic realizations, one in which a good autocrat is drawn in all non-
democratic periods and the other in which a bad autocrat is drawn in all non-democratic
periods. Figures 9a and 10a plot the expected welfare of an elite household under autocracy
and democracy for these two sequences of autocratic draws whereas Figures 9b and 10b break
down expected utility into its three components18. Note that at the start of each period, the
relevant state of the economy is the amount of parental bequests, which depends on the decision
of the elite in the previous period whether to democratize, and the policy choices of the ruler in
18 We have also analyzed the case where the realizations are elite autocrats. We do not report the results in
the text as they mimic the results for the bad realization economy.
22that period. Whereas both economies start out with the same t = 1 conditions, the one which
draws good autocrats is richer in all subsequent periods.
Both economies eventually democratize, although democratization happens two periods ear-
lier in the richer country, (period 7 in the good autocrat realization economy and period 9 in
the bad autocrat realization economy). For the reason given above, welfare under democracy
rises rapidly from a low starting point for both economies. Expected welfare under autocracy
displays a much slower rate of increase for both economies. As the welfare of the elite under
a good autocracy and elite autocracy both increase at the same rate as welfare under democ-
racy, the slower rate of increase of expected welfare under autocracy importantly re￿ ects the
decreasing probability of drawing an elite autocrat as the economy develops.19
We end this subsection by interpreting these results within the context of England￿ s histori-
cal record. As we interpret England to have been ruled by good autocrats following its Glorious
Revolution, the economy depicted in Figures 9a and 10a constitutes our model England. Democ-
ratization for this sequence of autocratic draws occurs in period 7, which given our ￿rst period
corresponds to 1650, implies a democratization date of 1860. This is roughly the year that Eng-
land extended the right to vote to better paid workers. Our calibrated model is thus consistent
with England￿ s political development. The model￿ s ability to match this democratization date
represents a successful test of our theory.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
We next turn to the question of how sensitive our results are to the choice of certain parameter
values and modeling assumptions. In particular, we consider how our results depend separately
on the persistence of Solow TFP barriers, the concentration of land holdings, and the probability
function of drawing each autocratic type.
5.4.1 Temporary Solow TFP Barriers
In the benchmark economy, we assumed that a Solow TFP barrier permanently reduced the
modern sector￿ s productivity. We now relax this assumption so that the barrier lasts only in
the period the policy is implemented. Namely, we now assume that Ast = (1￿￿st)(1+￿s)tAs0
and recompute the equilibrium paths when polity is ￿xed and unchanged over time, and there
is no decision by the elites over the political regime.
Figure 11 shows the per capita output paths of the four economies with ￿xed leader types.
The relevant ￿gure for comparison is Figure 5. As only the elite autocrat erects Solow TFP
19 Another force that is apparent in these ￿gures is the slow rate of increase in welfare in the bad autocratic
regime.
23barriers, there is no di⁄erence in development paths for the democracy, good autocracy, and
bad autocracy. The path for the elite autocracy is substantially altered, however. Speci￿cally,
with a temporary e⁄ect, the development path of the elite autocracy is very similar to the
democracy. In fact, its per capita output is slightly higher and closer to the good autocracy.
The reason for this is better performance is straightforward. Even though the elite autocrat
uses the TFP barrier to delay industrialization early on, eventually the elites bene￿t enough
from industrialization that they would not want any such barriers in place. With no lasting
e⁄ect, Solow TFP in the post industrialization period is just the frontier level, and hence output
of the elite is near that of the good autocracy.20
[Figure 11 here]
5.4.2 More Equitable Distribution of Land
It is generally believed that a more equitable distribution of land is conducive to the process of
democratization. For this purpose, we increase the size of the elite population holding the total
initial resources of the landed elite and working population the same as before and explore the
model￿ s predictions for the coevolution of political regimes and development. It follows that
each elite in the ￿rst period has a smaller initial bequest and a smaller land holding. Workers in
contrast will have the same bequests in the ￿rst period. Despite this more equitable holding of
land, we do not ￿nd any di⁄erence in democratization dates for the same history of autocratic
rulers. The reason is that the change in the initial conditions has two opposing e⁄ects on the
welfare of the elite under democracy. The reduction in land holdings per person implies that
democratization is not as harmful to the elite as in the benchmark prior to industrialization,
which works in the favor of hastening democratization. At the same time, with lower smaller
capital holdings and capital income, the elite bene￿t less from industrialization, and hence
democratization.
This neutrality result suggest that the mechanism whereby greater equity hastens democ-
ratization may be more related to politics than economics, and that we need to consider an
alternative political structure to the model to generate this result. In particular, we might need
to modify the model so that landed households are part of the lobbying group under democ-
racy. Currently, of course, only workers, or subsets of them, lobby in democracy. If landed
households were included in this group, then policy under democracy (both before and after
20 These two cases are extremes. An intermediate case would likely bring about a development path in between
the extremes. In a more realistic model whereby elites were forward looking in their decisions, the intermediate
case may be the one that most closely corresponds to the optimal choices. This is an interesting conjecture but
one that is beyond the scope of the paper to analyze.
24industrialization) would be closer to the one chosen by the elite autocrat. Hence, welfare of the
landed class under democratization would be larger in all periods, and democratization would
occur earlier. This is an interesting modi￿cation best left for future research.
5.4.3 Probabilities of autocratic types
As a ￿nal sensitivity check, we explore the implications for democratization of changing the func-
tion for the probability of drawing a bad autocrat. Recall, that in the benchmark experiment,
the probability of drawing a good autocrat was constant whereas the probability of drawing a
bad autocrat was an increasing and convex function of the economy￿ s total bequests. We now
consider two alternative formulations. In each, we maintain the assumption that the probabil-
ity of drawing a good autocrat in each period is equal to :10. In one formulation, however, we
assume that the probability of drawing the bad autocrat is an increasing, linear function of the
economy￿ s bequests whereas in the other we assume that the probability of drawing the bad
autocrat is also constant and equal to :10.
How do these alternative assumptions a⁄ect the date at which the economy democratizes?
In Figure 12a, we compare the welfare of the elite under autocracy and democracy for the
linear case, i.e., when PrB(Bt￿1) = minf:85;0:10+0:1Bt￿1g assuming that good autocrats are
realized in each non-democratic period whereas Figure 12b repeats this assuming that a bad
autocrat is drawn in each non-democratic period. The relevant comparison ￿gures are Figures
9a and 9b. What we see is that the linear assumption delays the date of democratization in both
economies. More importantly, we see that it also reduces the delay in democratization in the
bad autocratic country from 2 periods in the benchmark to a single period. These experiments
show that both the slope and curvature of the probability function for drawing a bad autocrat
are important for the model to predict that history a⁄ects the timing of democratization.21
[Figure 12a-b here]
6 Conclusions
This paper puts forth a uni￿ed theory of economic and political development whereby an econ-
omy peacefully transits to democracy once it becomes su¢ ciently rich. It does so by adding
a political layer to the uni￿ed growth theory of Hansen and Prescott (2002). The model ac-
counts for the observation that in the postwar period democracies have not grown faster than
autocracies on average, although they show smaller variation in growth experiences, and the
21 The results are similar for the constant probability case, except now there is no di⁄erence in democratization
dates. For reasons of space, we do not include the corresponding plots.
25observation that no long-lived autocracy is rich whereas every long-lived democracy is. Addi-
tionally, the model calibrated to the UK development experience is shown to correctly predict
the UK￿ s democratization experience.
There are a number of research areas to pursue. On the empirical side, this paper suggests
that more work is needed in examining the distribution of polity across nations and how it
has changed over time. Speci￿cally, we would like to classify autocracies by type, namely,
benevolent, elite, and kleptocratic, and use survival theory to estimate the probability of drawing
each type of autocrat, as well as transitional probabilities. On the theoretical side, there are
several areas to explore. One is to allow for forward looking behavior in the model. Another
is to consider a similar array of policy choices in a di⁄erent growth model where technological
change is not modeled as exogenous as it is in Hansen and Prescott (2002). Given the paucity
of papers that allow for the coevolution of polity and development and given the overwhelming
evidence of causation in both directions, we think this is a fertile area of future research.
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Figure 9a: Expected utility of the landed elite of autocracy and democracy. Probability of
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Figure 9b: Expected utility of the landed elite of alternative regimes. Probability of drawing a
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Figure 10a: Expected utility of the landed elite of autocracy and democracy. Probability of
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Figure 10b: Expected utility of the landed elite of alternative regimes. Probability of drawing
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Figure 12a: Expected utility of the landed elite of autocracy and democracy. Probability of
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Figure 12b: Expected utility of the landed elite of autocracy and democracy. Probability of
drawing a bad autocrat linear in capital. Bad draw.
38Tables
Table 1: Optimal policy under alternative (￿xed) political regimes.
Parameter Value Comment
￿ .60 historical estimates of land￿ s share as used in Hansen and Prescott (2002)
  .10 historical estimate of capital￿ s share of income used in Hansen and Prescott (2002)
￿m .032 average annual TFP growth rate of .3% per year pre-1700 as in Hansen and Prescott (2002)
Am1 1.0 normalization
￿ .40 capital￿ s share of income since 1900
￿s .518 average annual real GDP-growth of 2% per year since 19000
As1 .50 industrialization starting date 1750
N1 1.0 normalization
Ne1 .05 fraction of nobles in Western Europe in medieval period
Be0 .45 ensures non-decreasing capital stock and roughly constant
rental prices of land and labor in Malthusian era
Be1 .04 ensures non-decreasing capital stock and roughly constant rental prices
of land and labor in Malthusian era
￿ .90 expenditures on consumption equal to 90% of household income
f .10 10% of time spent on lobbying/political activities
39Table 2: Optimal policy under alternative (￿xed) political regimes.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Good
￿ut 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
￿bt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
￿lt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
￿st 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Solow
a N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Elite
￿ut 0 0 0 .50 .80 .80 .80 0 .50 .70 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80
￿bt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
￿lt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
￿st 0 0 0 0 0 .30 .30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Solow N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bad
￿ut 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
￿bt .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90
￿lt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
￿st 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Solow N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Democracy
￿ut 0 0 0 0 .40 .60 .70 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80 .80
￿bt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
￿lt .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90 .90
￿st 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Solow N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
a Indicates if the Solow technology is in use: Yes (Y ) or No (N).
40Appendix
Democracy
Suppose that the elite decide to democratize the country. The timing is then as follows.
1. One candidate is randomly drawn from the lobbying group, denoted A, and one candidate from the
non-lobbying group denoted B.










c) for c = A;B.
3. The lobbying group makes campaign contributions to the two candidates, thereby a⁄ecting the relative
popularity of the candidates.
4. Elections are held and the winning candidate￿ s policy ￿
c is implemented.
As in the standard Downsian framework, we assume that under democracy each candidate obtains some
ego rents from winning the election. These rents are not included in the government budget constraint. Each
candidate thus sets his policy in order to maximize the probability of winning the election.
We need to identify the swing voter in each group and establish how campaign contributions a⁄ect each
candidate￿ s probability of winning the election by shifting relative popularity from one candidate to the other.
Let Wh (￿
c) denote the indirect utility of a voter of type h = A;B as a function of the policy associated with









: Voters in the two groups have identical ideological preferences for candidates A and B











+ ￿ih + ￿ (22)
where ￿ is a parameter capturing the relative popularity of candidate B in the population as a whole. This
parameter can be positive or negative and is a⁄ected by campaign contributions:






where ￿ > 0; C
c denotes campaign contributions received by candidate c and e ￿ is inherent relative popularity of








: The swing voter in group h is by de￿nition indi⁄erent between


















Clearly, all voters with ￿ih ￿ ￿h also prefer candidate A to candidate B. Let ￿h denote the relative size of group
h; i.e. ￿A = ￿ and ￿B = 1 ￿ ￿. This implies that the vote share of candidate A, ￿






By the uniform distribution of ￿ih:

















Since the threshold value for the swing voter, ￿h, depends on the stochastic parameter e ￿ according to (23), the
vote share ￿
A is a stochastic variable. The probability of candidate A winning the election as a function of the












































c) is the utilitarian social welfare function and C
A = ￿CA. The probability that
candidate A wins the election is increasing in the social welfare associated with the candidate￿ s platform and in
campaign contributions C
A:
Next, consider the optimal contributions of the lobby. We assume that members of the lobbying group are
organized in one single lobby, seeking to maximize the expected utility of its members subject to a quadratic cost
function. The lobby can contribute to both candidates￿campaigns and decides on CA; how much each member

































subject to (24), taking the platforms ￿
A and ￿


































































The two candidates anticipate that the lobbying group will choose contributions according to (25). Therefore,
both candidates will converge to the same policy platform. Both candidates are willing to choose their platforms
such that they maximize their probability of winning the election, and both aim to please the lobbying group.
Recall that candidates maximize the probability of being elected. From (25) we know that only candidate A
will receive contributions. Using the de￿nition of the social welfare functions in (24), substituting for equilibrium
contributions (25), using the fact that C




















The ￿rst-order condition is:
￿
￿
  + ( ￿)
2￿ @WA
@￿A




Since both candidates will choose the same platform, ￿
A = ￿
B ￿ ￿

















In our model, we assume that prior to the period of industrialization t
￿, rural workers are lobbying while the
lobbying power is shifted to the urban workers in the modern era. In the numerical experiments, the working



















B) = 1=2 ￿  (￿WA(￿
B) + (1 ￿ ￿)WB(￿
B) + ￿( ￿)
2 WA(￿
B)):
42class constitute more than 95 percent of the population, implying that the population share of the lobbying
group, ￿; is close to one at all times. Since this implies that almost no weight is assigned to the non-lobbying
group according to (26) and we lack a prior for how to set   and ￿; we simply assume that the objective of the




Wrt if t ￿ t
￿
Wut if t > t
￿
Probability of Bad Autocrat
Suppose that population of elites is the set of possible autocratic rulers in the period. Assume that a certain
measure of these agents are saintly and thus never consider the possibility of being a kleptocrat or elite ruler.
Without loss of generality, assume that the measure of non-saintly elites are uniformly distributed on the unit
interval. Preferences of these elite di⁄er in how much each values consumption in the company of other elite.
In particular, assume that non-saintly elite are indexed by a social class preference parameter ￿
i 2 [0;1]: An
elite household that becomes the nation￿ s leader has the choice of being an elite autocrat or a kleptocrat. If
the leader chooses to be a kleptocrat, he is ostracized from his social class, which reduces the utility of private







where ￿ > 0.






The presence of the social class parameter, ￿, does not a⁄ect the allocation of the leader of his income between
his own consumption or bequests. He continues to allocate fraction ￿ of his income on his own consumption and
the remainder on bequests.
The income of the ruler will di⁄er depending on whether he is a kleptocratic ruler or an elite ruler. In the
case of a kleptocrat, his income is
Ibt = rlt(b)let + rkt(b)ket(b) + ￿bBt￿1
and in the case he is an elite ruler his income is
Iet = rlt(e)le + rkt(e)ket(e)












With elite types being distributed uniformly on the [0,1] interval, the probability that an elite (non-saintly)
household will be a kleptocratic ruler is Prt(b) = 1 ￿ Pr(￿
















































t￿1 > 0 is ￿ > ￿ and @
2Ibt=@Bt￿1 > 0:
44